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Trends in a tumultuous region
Middle East after the Arab Awakening 
Two years ago, what began as the individual protest of an aggrieved fruit seller in Tunisia 
exploded into the ‘Arab Awakening’—multiple, massive popular uprisings that swept across the 
Middle East. People-powered revolutions lopped the heads of governments in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Yemen and Libya in quick succession. Dictatorships that had been in power for decades were 
swept aside, some in a matter of weeks. The Arab Awakening also ushered in mass protests 
in Jordan, Morocco, Iran, Lebanon, Bahrain and other Gulf states with varying degrees of 
success in bringing reform. It also begat the chaos that is Syria, where protests elicited a violent 
government crackdown that quickly descended into sectarian civil war.
The region today is at best in flux and at worst in turmoil. What began as a positive story of 
peaceful revolutions has deteriorated into political mayhem, instability and war. There are a 
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Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of ousted President Mohamed Morsi demonstrate outside the Qobba Presidential Palace on 
6 September 2013 in Cairo, Egypt. Thousands of supporters turned out despite a sustained crackdown on Islamists by the country's new authorities.   
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number of constitutional challenges in many of these countries, political jockeying, violence and 
sectarian tensions. The economic and social problems that drove the initial protests haven’t got 
better but worse. The civil war in Syria, a popularly sanctioned military coup in Egypt, continued 
violence in Iraq and Libya and constitutional uncertainty in Tunisia have erased any hope of 
a seamless transfer to open societies and governments responsive to the people. The lofty 
expectations of the revolutions have yet to be fulfilled.
Two years after the start of the Arab uprisings, the Middle East remains as tumultuous as ever. The 
dynamic nature of the post-revolutionary period makes it difficult to predict what shape the future 
of the region will take. However, despite the uncertainty and flux, a number of emerging trends will 
influence the region in the post-revolutionary period and well into the future. Unfortunately, these 
trends do not bode well for a region already in turmoil.
The first is a marked uptick in sectarianism and sectarian violence. This is true not only in the 
obvious places, such as Iraq and Syria, but in Egypt and Yemen. Religious minorities are in 
precarious positions in many countries, and the Shia–Sunni divide is widening across the region. 
National sectarian conflicts aren’t contained within their countries, but have far-reaching regional 
implications, especially in the case of Syria, which is fast becoming a regional proxy war.
The second trend is a crisis within political Islam and a widening rift between secular and Islamist 
political forces. After decades in opposition and under persecution by authoritarian regimes, 
Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia deftly inserted 
themselves into political openings afforded by the overthrow of those same regimes in the immediate 
post-revolutionary period. 
However, once in power, they quickly squandered their opportunity. They governed ineptly and in 
a majoritarian, even authoritarian, manner, alienating a sizable majority of their populace. After 
only one year in office, Egypt’s Islamist president Mohamed Morsi was overthrown by a popularly 
backed military coup and his Muslim Brotherhood organisation was crushed by state security forces 
who arrested key leaders and violently broke up their demonstrations, killing hundreds of their 
supporters. The state is now moving to outlaw the group outright. Despite the return of the deep 
state in Egypt and the undemocratic nature of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ouster, this was done with 
the popular backing of most Egyptians. 
The result has been a newly radicalised political Islamist movement and politically polarised society. 
Similarly in Tunisia, Ennahda’s collaboration with ultraconservative salafi parties, who have been 
found responsible for a number of political assassinations of secular politicians, has alienated them 
further from secular Tunisians and has thrown the constitutional process into disarray. We also see 
greater radicalisation of political Islamist elements throughout the region, from Libya to Syria, where 
jihadist elements are gaining a foothold in those lawless frontiers. 
The third trend is the gradual disengagement and declining influence of the US in the Middle East. 
Eager to end its decade-long two-front wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and with declining leverage 
throughout the region, the Obama administration is in quietist mode. However, the United 
States’ reluctance to get involved in the Syrian conflict and its ambivalent stance on the political 
developments in Egypt, as well as its disengagement from Libya after the Benghazi debacle, has hurt 
its standing and compromised its position as guarantor of Western interests in the region.
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The revolutionary road
Before the Arab Awakening, the Middle East was a troublesome but fairly stable if not stagnant region 
of the world. The region was ruled by a number of monarchies and police states run by dictatorial 
regimes, many of which had been in power for over 30 years. Those regimes kept their populations’ 
passions in check, regional alliances and treaties intact and the jihadist threat and Islamist parties 
more or less at bay. The region wasn’t in any positive sense moving forward, but everyone knew the 
rules of the game and more or less what to expect. The international community knew which actors it 
had to work with, how much it could push on reforms and who it could cut deals with.
Middle East watchers knew of the deep-seated economic, political and demographic challenges 
and agreed that reform was desperately needed. However, no-one thought that those challenges 
would explode so unexpectedly and spontaneously in the Arab Awakening. After all, the Middle East 
had been slowly festering in its problems for decades—quick and decisive action wasn’t expected. 
Many analysts thought that the Middle East’s problems would continue to decay its societies but 
that the ruling elite would keep their stranglehold on power. Arab regimes had perfected the police 
state. Popular protests had been brutally shut down before. The speed and severity of the successive 
revolutions took everyone by surprise.
But one only had to peruse the annual UN Arab Human Development reports researched and written 
by Arab political scientists to realise that there was lava rising beneath this seemingly dormant 
landscape. The reports were eerily similar year after year, finding the region failing or vulnerable on 
numerous fronts—environmental stresses, lack of sustainable health and security, stagnant and 
inequitable economic development, political repression and lack of civil society, unsustainable 
demographics. As the decade wore on, the reports found these fault lines deepening.
Most significantly, the latest UN Arab Human Development report (issued in 2009, just a year and 
a half before the uprisings) found that Arab governments were not only underperforming for their 
citizens but that they themselves had become ‘threats’ to the human security of their citizens. The 
report concluded that ‘large and frequent shortfalls in these areas often combine to turn the state 
into a threat to human security instead of its chief support.’ Arab governments had little positive 
connection to their citizenry and were becoming increasingly insignificant and less able and willing to 
move their region forward.
The demographic bubble was a huge driver of the Arab revolutions. The Middle East is one of the 
youngest regions in the world. More than 60% of its 380 million people are under 29. The median age 
is 22: in some countries it’s younger. By 2050, this population will double. Egypt’s burdened by a 30% 
youth unemployment rate. In Algeria, an untenable 46% of young people are unemployed.1 All of 
these youth were ready to enter the workforce and marriage and desired to fully participate in society 
but saw none of that available to them.
The youth linked the limbo they were living in—their inability to get a better education, hold jobs 
and get married—to the wastefulness of the ruling powers. Arab rulers weren’t only squandering 
the future of their countries. They were squandering the personal future of young people by not 
educating them properly, by failing to build an economy that would create jobs and by stifling 
people’s voices through political repression.2 For the youth, it became personal. And, as we know, the 
personal is political. Arab citizens, particularly the youth, came to view the ruling elites not only as 
profligate but as threats to their personal futures.
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This generation also grew up in a time of unprecedented access to information and ability to 
communicate via the internet, satellite and social networking technologies. It was plugged into 
the outside world and knew that there was a better alternative, that others had freedoms and 
opportunities, and it wanted that for its societies as well.
The youth who drove the revolutionary protests were also aware that traditional opposition 
politics wouldn’t get them anywhere because of the repressive nature of the regimes. What political 
opposition parties existed were old-fashioned, secretive and ultimately useless, so they turned 
instead to cyberspace to organise and to air grievances.
Arab youth began to address social and political problems issue by issue, raising awareness and 
mobilising through social networking. With this type of activity, there’s no party platform or 
organisation to sustain. Individuals mobilised as the need arose and when the opportunity presented 
itself. That way, they were able to bypass government repression by not having a fixed presence and 
organisational hierarchies.
Technology gave an open space where the people could freely interact in ways they couldn’t in the 
physical realm. Cyberspace was open and transparent, provided forums for free expression and 
gave immediate access to information uncensored by the state. It stood in stark contrast to the 
authoritarian reality they were living in and it transformed their expectations and abilities.3
It was from this background that the revolutions sprang. The initial movements were led largely by 
idealistic youth groups that hoped to transform their societies into more participatory, more open 
and democratic ones. Theirs was a liberal and secular agenda, powered by an optimistic belief 
in technology and the spontaneous ability of people to come together to achieve a goal without 
traditional politics. Wael Ghonim, one of the youth leaders of the revolutionary protests, articulated 
this sentiment in a TEDx talk given weeks after Mubarak was removed from power. In the initial 
afterglow of the revolution, he said ‘we are going to win because we don’t understand politics. We are 
going to win because we are willing to stand up for our dreams. Egyptians felt freedom approaching. 
The power of the people is much stronger than people in power.’
Ghonim reflected a sentiment that was prevalent among the protesters—that they were above 
politics. The youth groups that drove many of the initial protests had no clear strategy after removing 
dictators from power. They believed their success in accomplishing this goal would build momentum 
for seamless change.
But their belief that they were above politics turned out to be naive and cavalier. They had experience 
protesting, but little experience organising politically. The advantage of organising spontaneously 
and without institutional infrastructures turned into a liability once those authorities had been 
toppled. There were no institutional structures to support them or their goals. Once the old powers 
were gone, a huge political vacuum was left to be filled. Constitutions had to be rewritten, elections 
slated, civil organisations formed. These were monumental tasks that they were not prepared for.
In the transition period, the liberal vision of the revolutionary organisers began to slip away. In its 
place came a slow but steady Islamisation of the immediate post-revolutionary period in the Middle 
East. However, the Islamists’ turn at power proved to be equally problematic. Having spent decades 
in opposition, they too were unable to transform themselves seamlessly into governing parties who 
could lead their countries during this fragile time and articulate an inclusive vision.
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Instead, they proved politically tone deaf and particularly inept in managing day-to-day governance. 
Having been shaped under the autocratic environment they opposed, they were equally stingy with 
power, paranoid and non-inclusive in government. Once in power, they managed to quickly squander 
whatever goodwill they had built in opposition and it brought their swift downfall. The result of their 
failure to govern was a deep polarisation of their societies. Nowhere was this more apparent than 
in Egypt.
Polarised politics of Islamists vs secularists 
The post-revolutionary transition has been particularly chaotic and troublesome in Egypt. The 
Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest Islamist political party, mostly stayed on the sidelines during the 
initial revolutionary protests. As an old-school opposition party used to operating in seclusion and 
under the constant threat of arrest and repression, it was wary of the unorganised people-powered 
protests and just as surprised by the speed with which the governments in Egypt and Tunisia fell.
In stark contrast to the impatient protesters, the Muslim Brotherhood had set out a slow-burn 
strategy for implementing its vision. Over the years, it sought to influence Egypt’s institutions 
and slowly Islamise from within, focusing on social work and da’wa.4 In order to survive as an 
organisation, it was just as secretive, hierarchical and slow-moving as the governments it opposed. 
It was acting from an abundance of caution, given its experience with past repression, and had no 
interest in a revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood in fact banned its members from participating in 
the protests in Tahrir Square until it was all but certain that Mubarak would go. Only then did the 
Brotherhood throw its support behind the revolution and take advantage of the political opening that 
the young secular protesters carved out.
The revolution presented the Muslim Brotherhood with an undeniable opportunity. It already had 
an operation in place to come out ahead in the parliamentary and presidential elections. Throwing 
out its previous cautious strategy, the Brotherhood jumped into the deep end of Egyptian politics. 
The Brotherhood contested a number of parliamentary seats, ran a candidate for president and 
dominated the constitutional drafting process. This was despite its public promises to seek a limited 
role in politics and not run a presidential candidate. 
Although it didn’t win an outright mandate, the Brotherhood governed as if it did, alienating 
many segments of Egyptian society who were sceptical of its Islamist vision. President Mohamed 
Morsi’s tenure was markedly incompetent. Morsi failed to address any of Egypt’s myriad of social 
and economic problems. He alienated the secular parties by refusing to compromise on their key 
concerns and generally behaved in the same authoritarian manner as previous Egyptian rulers, 
by jailing dissenters, pushing past the opposition and alienating ordinary Egyptians by arbitrary 
governance. Instead of instituting programs to solve bread and butter issues, the most pressing 
concerns for Egyptians, he continued to focus on Islamising programs that made the broader 
Egyptian society increasingly uncomfortable. 
Morsi’s tenure became untenable. A political movement called Tamarod, or ‘Rebel’, began gathering 
signatures for a no-confidence petition calling President Morsi to step down from power. It gathered 
over 20 million signatures and took to the streets in protest, with demonstrations that surpassed 
those of the original 2011 revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood, meanwhile, stood defiant in the 
face of such protests. It continued to insist that it represented the will of the majority, while the 
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protesters represented an old elite still smarting from its electoral defeats. But the protests spoke for 
themselves. 
The Egyptian military, led by General Abdel Fatah al Sisi, saw the strength of the protests, the popular 
dissatisfaction with the Brotherhood and Morsi’s rule in particular, and moved to remove him. As 
quickly as massive protests felled Mubarak, so too did they to Morsi, but this time barely less than a 
year after he took office. The military takeover was efficient and swift. Morsi was detained, as were 
key Brotherhood officials. Emergency rule was put in place, with the military once again promising a 
road map to transition to civilian rule. 
Though the mechanics of regime removal were similar—massive protests that spurred military 
takeover—Egyptian society was now more fragmented and polarised. Deep divisions within Egyptian 
society that emerged when the Muslim Brotherhood assumed power grew during its tenure and 
widened into deep chasms when the military takeover removed it from power. Egyptian society 
polarised into two camps—pro- and anti-Brotherhood. Suspicions have turned to hatreds, fuelled by 
a similarly polarised media landscape.
The Brotherhood’s rush to power and its failure to build coalitions and articulate a unified vision 
for Egypt deeply alienated millions of Egyptians. But the military coup, despite its popularity, also 
alienated a sizable minority of Egyptians, mostly of Brotherhood supporters who are becoming 
increasingly radicalised. 
After Morsi was removed from power, the Brotherhood marshalled its supporters and countered 
with large protests and sit-ins of its own. For weeks it took over the area surrounding the Rabaa al 
Adawiya Mosque in Cairo. The mood in the sit-ins grew increasingly radicalised, with supporters of 
the former president vowing to take up arms. The military operation that cleared the sit-in was brutal 
and retrograde, with many civilians caught in the crossfire. By the time they were ultimately cleared, 
hundreds were dead, including the children of leading Muslim Brotherhood figures.5 
In retaliation, Muslim Brotherhood supporters in Cairo and other governorates, particularly 
in southern Egypt, burned police headquarters and targeting Coptic Christian churches and 
establishments, fuelling sectarian tensions further. The hope that the Brotherhood would be 
humbled and moderate after its removal was dashed. Many of its supporters are now vowing terrorist 
attacks as revenge and have given up on the electoral process. According to one young Brother:
 Many of the youth now say, no more ballot boxes. We used to believe in the caliphate. The 
international community said we should go with ballot boxes, so we followed that path. But then 
they flip the ballot boxes on us. So forget it. If ballot boxes don’t bring righteousness, we will all go 
back to demanding the caliphate.6 
Brotherhood supporters recently made good on their threats of violence. Extremists recently 
targeted the convoy of Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim, a man and a ministry they hold 
responsible for the recent crackdown against them. Ibrahim survived the assassination attempt but 
22 others were injured.7 Bombings are a rare occurrence in Egypt, even at the height of extremist 
Islamist activity in the 1990s. This portends a troubling violent future for Egypt, one that could be 
defined by a ongoing battle against an Islamist insurgency. 
A similar backlash against Islamists and deepening fissures between pro- and anti-Islamist camps is 
evident in Tunisia. As in Egypt, an Islamist opposition party, Ennahda, came into power on the heels 
of the protests. It was considered more moderate than the Brotherhood and more willing to work 
Strategic Insights 7
with secular opposition groups, but its rise to power was nevertheless unnerving to many secular 
Tunisians. Particularly troublesome was Ennahda’s inability or unwillingness to reign in more radical 
salafist groups that grew emboldened in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Ire against Islamists grew when 
salafists were found responsible for the assassination of two liberal Tunisian politicians. 
Under the previous Ben Ali government, preachers and mosques were strictly controlled. The 
government approved every prayer leader and vetted topics for Friday sermons. After the revolution, 
salafist groups seized control of hundreds of mosques. Although the current government has claimed 
it regained control of many of them, it’s still battling salafist groups and hasn’t been able to control 
their sometimes violent actions or thwart their extremist agenda.
In rural towns across Tunisia, demonstrations by salafist groups have descended into violent brawls. 
In the town that began the Arab Awakening, Sidi Bouzeid, a group of salafists ransacked the sole hotel 
that sold alcohol.8
Salafist clerics in Tunisia continue to promote ultraconservative goals, such as immediately putting 
Islamic law into effect, the veiling of women (particularly the full niqab), outlawing alcohol, shunning 
the West and joining the jihadi forces in Syria. Although they participated in elections, ‘Democracy, 
they insist, is not compatible with Islam.’9
Salafist groups were also responsible for setting off the worst crisis in Tunisia’s post-revolutionary 
period with the assassination of human rights activist and opposition politician Choukri Belaid, 
who was shot outside his home in February 2013. His death set off a wave of protests against the 
government, which many believed was kowtowing to hardline groups, and brought the resignation 
of the prime minister. Months later, another liberal politician, parliamentarian Mohamed Brahmi, 
was shot by gunmen in the same manner as Belaid outside his home. Authorities pointed to the ultra 
salafist group Ansar al Sharia as responsible for the killings, but many Tunisians believe that Ennahda 
and Tunisian security forces conspired with the group in the killings. 
Inspired by Egypt’s Tamarod campaign, Tunisians also initiated their own signature campaign against 
the government. The Tunisian Tamarod campaign is conducting ongoing demonstrations in front 
of the Constitutional Assembly. They are demanding the removal of the current government, the 
dissolving the current National Constituent Assembly and the forming a new consensual government, 
as well as a more thorough investigation of the assassinations of Belaid and Brahmi. Some are also 
calling for the removal of President Moncef Marzouki. 
Tamarod campaigns have also taken hold in Bahrain, Libya, Morocco and Palestine. In Palestine and 
Morocco they’re also calling for the removal of Islamist authorities. While they don’t want a military 
takeover as happened in Egypt, they’re agitating in the same way against what they see as undue and 
corrupt Islamist influence in their countries. 
In Turkey, often heralded as an example of moderate and effective Islamist governance, there have 
been protests and agitation against Erdogan’s rule. In July 2013, small sit-ins protested against a 
planned urban development for Istanbul’s Ghezi Park. The brutal break-up of the protests through 
arrests and tear gas turned the sit-ins into riots, and the protests expanded into Occupy-like camps 
in Istanbul and other major cities across Turkey. They came to encompass broader anti-government 
concerns, such as freedom of the press and assembly. The protesters eventually ended their sit-ins, 
but Erdogan’s reputation and popularity took a severe hit and anti-government protesters were 
emboldened against his rule. 
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Erdogan’s influence has also been affected regionally. He was a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt and hoped it would follow the model of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP). The Turkish president has also aspired to regional leadership, and a close 
relationship with Egypt was key to regional influence. But after the Muslim Brotherhood’s ouster, 
Erdogan is out of step across the region. Erdogan agitated against the coup, calling what happened in 
Egypt a conspiracy of the US and Israel. By doing so he alienated Egypt’s new leaders and their allies, 
Saudi Arabia and others. 
Erdogan’s response to the Taksim protests also diminished his star in the Arab world after he was 
once hailed for supporting the protests of the Arab Spring. Once feted across Arab capitals, Erdogan 
is now criticised for doing the same thing by forcefully shutting down dissent. The Turkish Islamist 
governance model is not looking so appealing across the Arab world. 
While it may seem like Islamists’ fortunes are on the wane, they’re a force that has a long and deep 
history in the Middle East. Just because the Brotherhood is currently out of power in Egypt and 
there’s growing dissatisfaction with Ennahda in Tunisia and the AKP in Turkey does not necessarily 
mean a return to a liberal political environment. This isn’t the end of political Islam; rather, it will be 
a political Islam that’s more prone to violence, less willing to participate in elections and less able to 
exert organisational discipline. It will be one that’s even less willing to work with liberal and secular 
forces, portending a continuous divide across the region. 
Sectarianism’s grip
Given Islam’s dominance over the region, it’s often forgotten that the Middle East is incredibly diverse, 
with different ethnic groups, minority sects and Christian denominations that have deep historical 
roots. But, as Islamist groups dominated politics in the post-revolutionary period (whether the Sunni 
Arab Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Shia political parties in Iraq), minority groups and pluralistic 
traditions have been threatened.
The political rule of Islamist groups isn’t the only factor contributing to growing sectarianism. 
Sectarianism has been building since before the Arab Awakening, but the collapse of authoritarian 
rule and the chaos of the post-revolutionary period have allowed sectarian identity politics to thrive 
and grow. The sectarian divisions range from the civil war raging in Syria, to the Shia uprising in 
Bahrain against a minority Sunni monarchy, to the struggles of Christian minorities in Iraq and Egypt, 
to the ever-widening regional divide between Sunni and Shia majority states. Sectarian identity is 
now more than ever becoming the defining feature of the new politics and culture in the Middle East.
There are three drivers of sectarianism in the Middle East today. The first is the growing stricture of 
Sunni Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia, in addition to the rule of the AKP in Turkey, which has 
been touted as an example of Islamist democracy. Viable Sunni Islamist political parties, supported 
by wealthy Sunni Gulf monarchies, particularly Qatar, are presenting a challenge to previous 
Shia ascendency.
For many years, Shia Iran could claim to be the only Islamist government in the region, but the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the US occupation of Iraq brought another major state within 
the Shia orbit. Lebanese Hezbollah grew in strength, winning nationwide elections and effectively 
operating a parallel government in its area of control. The Iranian and Hezbollah-backed Shia Alawite 
Assad regime in Syria completed the Shia crescent.
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But the emergence of Sunni Islamist governments in the post-revolutionary period began to tilt 
the balance back to the Sunni camp. Wealthy Gulf states stepped in with monetary assistance in 
the transition period. Qatar and Saudi Arabia are large funders of Sunni Islamist groups in Egypt.10 
Qatar in particular supported Morsi and now it and Saudi Arabia are throwing their support behind 
Egypt’s generals—who, while not officially Islamist, are nevertheless a bulwark against Shia Iran, Iraq 
and Syria. 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia have also funded numerous salafi parties around the region, amplifying 
the salafists’ political power disproportionally to their support within their own countries. Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia have also provided millions in funding and arms to anti-Assad rebels in Syria, 
particularly the hardline jihadi elements, such as the Al-Nusra Front.
The second driver of sectarianism in the new Middle East is the Syrian civil war. A Sunni-led 
insurgency is battling a minority Shia Alawite government, with the rest of the country’s Christians, 
Shia and Druze twisting in the tornado kicked up by both sides. The Syrian civil war has not only 
welded sectarian identities in Syria, but also become a proxy sectarian conflict for the entire region.
According to a recent analysis by Geneive Abo:
 Each new turn in Syria, whether facts on the ground or merely perceptions of new threats and 
new alignments that may emerge, reverberates throughout the Levant and the Persian Gulf. In 
this way, the Syrian war has provided a mechanism for amplifying traditional sectarian conflict, 
effectively elevating it to a transnational affair. The Sunni in Lebanon believe that by confronting 
Hizballah they are fighting for all Sunni, especially their persecuted co-religionists in Syria who 
are being slaughtered at the hands of President Bashar al-Asad’s Alawite-dominated regime. 
Likewise, the Shi‘a in Bahrain believe their uprising is for the benefit of all Shi‘a in the region, 
particularly their long-oppressed brethren across the border in Saudi Arabia. In Lebanon and 
the Persian Gulf, sectarianism has become so pronounced that Sunni clerics now warn of the 
‘Shiitization’ of the Middle East and exploit the brutality committed by Asad’s regime to spur calls 
for outright Sunni ascendancy.11
Hezbollah’s involvement has added a new dimension to the Syrian conflict, entrenching sectarian 
divides further. The group was once admired by both Shia and Sunni groups for its organisational and 
military prowess, but its entry into the Syrian conflict on the side of the Assad regime has steeled the 
determination of the Sunni insurgents. It’s also given additional fodder to the jihadists among them 
to frame this as more of a sectarian battle than a fight to oust a brutal dictatorship. Sunni and Shia 
from neighbouring countries are entering Syria, with fighters from Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf states and 
even Egypt crossing the border to join the fight on their respective sides.
The Syrian civil war has also incited Sunni–Shia battles in other countries. There was a marked 
increase in violent sectarian attacks in Iraq in 2012. Shia militias are resurgent, attacking Sunni 
gatherings, and Sunni jihadist groups are attacking majority Shia areas, echoing the fierce sectarian 
violence of 2006 and 2007. The US troop surge in 2007 helped stem the violence at that time, and 
the Shia, confident in their control of the government and security forces, stopped responding in 
tit-for-tat attacks. That’s now no longer the case. Sunni insurgents, who never quite gave up their 
fight against the Shia-led government, are ramping up their attacks and Shia militias and rogue 
government security forces are once again responding.12
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The sectarian creep of the Syrian civil war is most evident in Lebanon, where there have been 
reciprocal car bombings targeting Shia and Sunni mosques and neighbourhoods. A car bomb attack 
in Tripoli in late August 2013 killed 24 and injured hundreds—the worst instance of sectarian violence 
in years. The Alawite community in Lebanon as well as long-time Assad ally, Hezbollah, support the 
Assad regime in Syria, while Lebanon’s Sunni leaders have thrown their support behind the Syrian 
rebel fighters. Both Shia and Sunni Lebanese religious leaders have ties to their corresponding sides 
in Syria and are supporting the fighting through arms, men and logistics support.13 
Lebanon has a long history of sectarianism and fought a brutal 15 year long civil war along sectarian 
lines. It doesn’t take much to disrupt the precarious balance of its many sects, and the Syrian civil 
war has now tipped it over. Hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees are crossing over into Lebanon, 
increasing tensions in the way Palestinian refugees did decades ago. Syrian rebels and the Assad 
government are using Beirut as a staging base and administrative and logistics centre, marshalling 
Lebanese supporters to their cause. As Lebanon becomes more involved with the Syrian sides, its 
fragile sectarian quilt is becoming unravelled once again. 
The third driver or sectarianism in the post-revolutionary period is the sweeping aside of pluralistic 
traditions in favour of Islamist or sectarian identities. Minority groups, who were the main guardians 
of the pluralist tradition, are either fleeing or are being squeezed out of their countries as sectarian 
tensions and Islamist identities take hold.
Coptic Christians are leaving Egypt in record numbers; an estimated 90,000–100,000 Copts left in 
the early months after Mubarak’s ouster.14 Violent attacks against Copts have increased since the 
revolution, even though Coptic Christians actively participated in the revolutionary protests along 
with their Muslim compatriots. There was hope in the post-Mubarak period that a new spirit of 
citizenship would expand opportunities for all Egyptians, but the election of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the boldness of salafi groups have threatened the safety and livelihood of many Copts and 
have made them feel that there’s little space for them in the new Egypt. In fact, salafi groups openly 
advocate that Copts should be relegated to second class citizens protected as dhimmi under Islamic 
law. But it isn’t only Islamist groups that have targeted the minority Christian community; the state 
has also been responsible for violence against them. 
Attacks against Copts began soon after the revolution with the ‘Maspero Massacre’. The military 
opened fire on peaceful Coptic protesters by the Maspero building in downtown Cairo, killing 28, 
and then used state television to exhort Egyptian citizens to come down and fight with the military 
against the Copts. Since then, the Coptic cathedral has been attacked, and police were caught on 
camera aiding the attackers. Hundreds more small-scale attacks against Copts, their properties and 
businesses have occurred.
After the military coup ousted the former President Mohamed Morsi, his Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters retaliated by going after Coptic establishments. Churches and monasteries were looted 
and burned. Coptic homes, youth centres and even one orphanage were attacked, leaving people 
injured or dead. Coptic activists recorded the destruction of 38 churches and additional attacks 
against 23 others. The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters used Copts as scapegoats, and the 
authorities either chose or could do little to stop the attacks.15 
It’s not only in Egypt that minorities are being squeezed. In Lebanon, Libya, Iraq and Syria, Christian 
and other minorities are facing attacks and their numbers are dwindling as many seek asylum. 
Iraq’s Christian population has fallen from 1.4 million in 1987 to 500,000 today. In Syria, Christians, 
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who made up an influential minority, are suffocated by the civil war, fearing both the Assad regime 
and what might come if he goes. Syrian Christians have also been fleeing in record numbers, joining 
the hundreds of thousands of refugees. Entire Christian villages like Deir al-Zour and Hasakah 
in northeastern Syria have emptied as lawlessness and attacks against them by extremist rebel 
groups have risen. Though some Christians have opposed the Assad regime, they’re still targeted by 
al-Qaeda linked groups and are kidnapped for ransom and forced conversions. Some Christians have 
complained that their participation in the rebel movement was not welcome. ‘We are not with the 
regime. [But] many times the Islamists didn’t want us to join them in the demonstrations. We tried to 
participate but we were not given a role. It felt as though it was a strategy to force Christians out of 
the revolution.’16 Other Syrian Christians have chosen neutrality and have refused to join sides, but 
that leaves them vulnerable and unprotected on all fronts. 
Whither the West
All this has become a huge challenge not only for the people of the Middle East but for the rest of the 
world, particularly the West. The international community hasn’t figured out how to best engage the 
region and how to assist in its transition while first doing no harm. This sentiment is perhaps most 
clearly embodied in the Syrian civil war—a clear humanitarian disaster claiming 100,000 lives and 
displacing millions more. With the war flaring into a regional sectarian battle and no clear ‘good guys’ 
to support, the West, particularly the US, is at a loss as to how and how far to engage in the conflict. 
After two years of resisting pressure to intervene, the Obama administration has publicly stated that 
the United States is providing arms to the rebels in Syria (albeit in a limited capacity) and is preparing 
for further military strikes, after concluding that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against 
insurgents—a ‘red line’ drawn by Washington, if the Russian US agreement on the dismantling of the 
Syrian chemical weapons program does not hold. 
After a tense few weeks of ‘will he or won’t he' conduct a military strike on Syria, the Obama 
administration was temporarily saved from having to act on the threat by a surprise Russian 
proposal, acquiesced to by Syria, that the Assad regime give up his chemical weapons program 
to international monitoring and eventual destruction. The 'Framework for Elimination of 
Syrian Chemical Weapons', was reached after a marathon session of negotiations in Geneva on 
14 September. The agreement calls for the entire arsenal of chemical weapons to be removed or 
destroyed by mid-2014. If the Syria government does not comply, the matter will be referred to the UN 
Security Council where violations would be taken up under Chapter VII.  
However, even though a framework agreement has been reached, it is still not at all clear that the 
diplomatic negotiations will hold. There are major differences emerging in the draft UN resolution 
to formalise the deal.  Russia continues to resist parts of the draft resolution that discuss the threat 
of force should Syria not comply with the conditions of the agreement. They are also objecting to 
language formally condemning Syria for chemical weapons use and the issue of whether to refer 
officials suspected of chemical weapons use to the International Criminal Court. There are also 
differences of interpretations regarding Chapter VII language in the agreement. Russian officials 
interpret it to mean that Chapter VII is only one option that would be considered at a later date, with 
any use of force requiring a separate resolution. The United States, France and Britain want the 
current draft resolution to state that the threat of Chapter VII would be conferred immediately. 
The threat of a military strike remains very real. Both the United States and France have publically 
stated they reserve the right to conduct unilateral military action against the Assad regime, 
12 Trends in a tumultuous region: Middle East after the Arab Awakening
irrespective of a UN resolution, should they not comply with the Framework Agreement. But a limited 
military strike may do little to degrade the Assad’s regime capacity. It may also embolden the regime 
to go further in its response against the rebel fighters and civilians, even conducting more chemical 
weapons attacks. Military strikes may also inadvertently harm civilians—a reality that jihadist fighters 
and the Assad regime can manipulate. A strike could also increase the ranks of internationally and 
externally displaced Syrians. 
Ironically, assisting the rebel fighters will also lead to an outcome that the US can’t fully support. 
The Syrian opposition is now dominated by jihadist and extremist elements that will dominate and 
jeopardise Syria’s other sects. The alternative to Assad is not appealing or in the West’s interests.17
Support for the rebels remains tepid and, at this stage, it isn’t clear that the additional arms 
shipments or military strikes will help resolve the Syrian conflict in a manner that is good for regional 
stability and Western interests. The arms shipments will be limited in scope and to particular rebel 
groups. There’s also the risk that arms sent to moderate rebel groups will fall into the hands of 
the more effective jihadist fighters, such as the Al-Nusra Front and al Ahrar al Sham. The US has 
encouraged Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan to provide arms and training, but much of that 
assistance, particularly by the Gulf monarchies, has been directed towards jihadist groups who are no 
friends of the West.
Despite the Obama administration’s assurances that any military strike will be targeted and limited 
in nature, one cannot discount the risk that the US will be sucked into a protracted campaign when 
initial military strikes prove limited in their effectiveness—a reality that will complicate an already 
knotty conflict. The Syrian conflict is no longer a rebellion against a brutal regime. It has transformed 
into a battle between Syria’s various sects over control of the country. It’s also a jihadist front line 
as well as a proxy regional conflict for influence between Iran, the Gulf states and Turkey. Assad’s 
allies, Iran and Hezbollah, will be compelled to step up their support. Military strikes on Syria will not 
just be about punishing the Assad regime for its brutality but will factor in this complex melange of 
interests.18 
The Obama administration has stated that it’s not interested in precipitating regime change through 
a military strike but in sending a message that chemical weapons use is unacceptable. It must back 
up its ‘red line’ threat in order to deter other hostile actors, such as Iran and North Korea, in the 
future. The US–Russian agreement on the inspection and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons 
stockpile does not address any resolution to the Syrian civil war nor the creep of the Syrian civil war to 
its neighbours—countries like Turkey and Iraq where the US has clear geopolitical strategic interests.  
The results of action and inaction are both unappealing. The cliché that the United States has no 
good options regarding Syria is all too true.
Additionally, US influence is limited not only by a paucity of suitable partners in the rebel movement 
but also because of its own actions. Allies in the region have described the US position on Syria as 
‘feckless.’ The tepid US support is in contrast to Iran’s strong support for the Assad regime. Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan have cut the US out of a rebel training program because of what they see as a lack 
of US commitment. At the same time, the United Arab Emirates refused to host a defence officials 
meeting in the absence of what it believes to be strong US leadership.19 
The US’s lack of leadership and clear strategy on the Syrian issue is clearly fraying its relations with 
those allied Middle Eastern governments that remain. At the same time, it can’t count on the support 
of traditional allies like the UK, whose parliament ruled out British military action in Syria. Australia, 
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too, is unwilling to commit to a substantial military role in Syria. Coordinated international action 
in Syria is proving impossible as other influential international actors such as Russia, China and Iran 
assert themselves in the region and in international forums. The US may also be forced to initiate 
a military intervention illegally, without United Nations approval, as any resolution will surely be 
vetoed by Russia or China.
Syria’s a microcosm of what now faces the US in the Middle East. Washington has no clear options and 
few allies to work with. It’s struggling to come to terms with a new Middle East and shape its policies 
towards the region accordingly. The revolutions swept away a number of authoritarian regimes that 
had anchored the Middle East in a relatively stable, if stagnant, configuration that governed the 
region for decades. With many of those relationships gone, the US is struggling to build new ones and 
find new ways to secure its interests. It’s also finding it difficult to enlist the support of its traditional 
allies in Europe and Asia to respond to a troubled region.
The US is less able to influence outcomes in the Middle East today for a number of reasons. First, the 
dynamics of the Arab revolutions were completely outside the US’s and any other country’s purview. 
They were authentic indigenous uprisings with no international support. With the exception of 
Libya, there was no international intervention, and thus little international influence, in the change 
of governments. 
Even though the US was deeply engaged in the region for the past decade and fighting a two-front 
war in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was blindsided by the revolutions of the Arab Awakening. Perhaps 
it didn’t see the signs because of its deep involvement in the so-called global war on terror. The US 
also believed that its main interests lay in successfully completing the Iraq and Afghan engagements. 
If it did so, the thinking went, its nation-building efforts in those two countries, coupled with other 
counterterrorism efforts, would end the threat from jihadists and propel political reform in the 
region. The Bush administration hoped it could transform Iraq into ‘a beacon on a hill’, a shining 
example of democracy and good governance after Saddam for the rest of the Middle East to follow. 
That didn’t happen as planned and the US’s reputation suffered. 
Furthermore, the dominant actors that have emerged in the post-revolutionary period are untested 
partners and they’re wary of the West and vice versa. Part of reason that the US in particular 
maintained its imperfect relationship with the region’s dictators, such as Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak 
in Egypt and Saleh in Yemen, was precisely because it was fearful that promoting reform and 
democratisation more vigorously would install Islamist parties with large question marks over their 
commitment to democracy and human rights and their willingness to engage with the international 
community. Now it’s precisely those parties that have emerged out of the political chaos into 
governance, and all are uncertain how to proceed.
The West is not quite sure how to engage with the new governments that have emerged or assist in 
brokering through the political and constitutional stalemates that have emerged in places like Egypt 
and Tunisia. 
Though Egypt has returned to rule by military generals, the old partners of the US, Washington has a 
deep ambivalence over how they came to power. The new officers in charge of the Egyptian military 
are equally ambivalent about the US, because they perceive that US officials were unsupportive 
of their military takeover. There’s a great deal of uncertainty over how to proceed, how to use 
military aid as leverage and whether a return to military rule is in the best interests of the US–Egypt 
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relationship. American leverage and credibility have taken a strong hit in Egypt. There’s a virulent 
anti-Americanism on display in Egypt not seen since the days of Nasser. 
Second, there’s also little desire on the part of the American public and the Obama administration 
to engage in the Middle East. The administration has taken a conscious decision to decrease its 
interventions in the region. The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan didn’t go according to plan. 
Both endeavours were sold to the American people as easy interventions when they were anything 
but. It isn’t clear that the US accomplished the goals it set out in those military campaigns. Both 
countries have become more complicated, violent and corrupt and have fallen further outside the US 
sphere of influence.
The American public and the American policy community have taken important lessons from these 
experiences and have developed an isolationist streak. The public doesn’t understand why it had 
to send its sons and daughters out to die in the desert when the region resents them and American 
interests aren’t even being realised. The focus in the US at the moment is decidedly domestic. The 
loudest applause during President Obama’s second inaugural address came when he said he’d close 
the door on a decade defined by two wars in the Middle East.
Syria is complicating this strategy, however. President Obama is now compelled to bring the US 
into another Middle East conflict. Having issued a threat that the US would take action if the norms 
against using chemical weapons were violated, he must now do so if the diplomatic agreement does 
not hold in order to protect his own administration’s and the country’s credibility. Many in Congress, 
including many members of his own party, are expressing deep reservations about approving 
a military strike against Syria. His congressional supporters are facing deep pressure from their 
constituents to go against a strike.20
Third, new and growing oil and gas production in the US is propelling America towards a long-held 
goal of energy independence. Reliance on foreign sources of energy, particularly in the Middle East, 
has often been the driver of the US’s military and political extension in the region. Since the 1956 Suez 
crisis, the US has been the pre-eminent political, military and economic international player. 
But in 2012, only 40% of oil consumed in the US was imported—the lowest proportion since 1991.21 
While the US will continue to play a critical security role in the region for many years to come, new 
extraction techniques in the form of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have unlocked a 
hydrocarbons resource previously unavailable in the US. That, combined with a move towards the 
use of lighter crude oils and alternative energy sources and increases in energy efficiency, has raised 
the likelihood that over time dependence on Middle Eastern oil will drop.22 
Domestic politics in Middle Eastern countries is also playing a greater role in foreign policy, which 
used to be dictated by regional proxy contests and the influence of global players. Now, as politics 
in the Middle East is being driven more by elections, domestic interests are driving foreign policy, in 
much the same way as they have in the West for decades. On many matters, such as the platform of 
Islamist parties, the nature of internal domestic reforms and counterterrorism tactics, the US has 
been out of step with Arab opinion for many years and has lost its cache among the elites. It’s just as 
unable to affect domestic Arab opinion.23 
So where does this leave us? The Middle East is now arguably more unstable than under the 
dictatorships and authoritarian governments that were overthrown. The initial hope that the 
spontaneous people-powered protests would bring about lasting democratic change, slowly but 
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surely, has waned. Instead, a Pandora’s box of problems has been opened. The Middle East was 
always a mélange of complications but is now even more so. It’s going through a period of profound 
uncertainty and chaos. The appetite of the international community, particularly the West, to engage 
is slim, and it’s uncertain how to do so even if the West wants to.
Australia’s role
Like the rest of the West, Australia’s role in influencing events is limited. To be fair, Australia never 
exerted a great deal of leverage in the region to begin with, but as a crucial allied partner of the US, it 
often hitched its wagon to America’s endeavours and fate in the region. It seems that with America’s 
and the West’s declining influence comes a corresponding decline of Australia’s.
However, Australia is currently uniquely positioned to exert more influence than it normally would 
through its role on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), particularly when it comes to the 
Syrian crisis and dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Australia has a UNSC seat for the next year and 
a half, and it must decide what it wants to do with that short time. Action from this divided council 
is slow going. Russia and China often block attempts at international intervention, no matter how 
worthy. The Syrian conflict is a case in point.
The Foreign Ministry has been active in advocating for a political solution to the Syrian crisis but, 
like the rest of the international community, has been stymied by Russia. Working up a plan for a UN 
resolution to the Syrian conflict won’t be easy, and it’s unclear how much an impact Australia or other 
international actors will have, given Russia’s intransigence. Moscow’s still smarting from Libya, where 
the UN-mandated intervention (backed by Russia at the time) went from humanitarian intervention 
to regime change.24 
Without gaining Russia’s support, it will be difficult for Australia to move forward many of its 
proposals to assist Syria and shore up regional stability. Even minimalist intervention is being 
opposed. Russia and China are currently blocking an Australian proposal for a ‘medical pact’ in 
which medical personnel and medical facilities would be protected and quarantined from the 
conflict.25 Despite the difficulties, Australia must continue to advocate for what’s right on the 
humanitarian level.
Australia should, as a leader in the Security Council and on humanitarian principle do what it can to 
assist this desperate humanitarian situation and bolster the norm against chemical weapons use 
through robust diplomacy to shepherd through a UN resolution and inspection’s regime that would 
ensure the destruction of Syria’s chemical stockpile.   
It’s important that Australia do so, as a reflection of Australian values, but also because Australia’s 
actions and involvements on the international stage in relation to Syria will also have an impact 
at home.
Scores of Australians have travelled to Syria, some to help out on the humanitarian side, but others 
to join the rebel fighters. The Australian Federal Police estimates that more than a hundred have 
gone over to fight with jihadist groups in Syria and is concerned that they can return to Australia, 
battle-hardened and potentially continuing their jihad in Australian cities.26
The sectarian conflicts in Syria are also being played out in Australia’s major cities. Rival supporters 
of the Assad regime and the rebellion are threatening one another in Sydney and Melbourne. Syrian 
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community leaders in Sydney claim that Australian-based supporters of the al-Qaeda affiliated 
Al-Nusra Front are driving much of this.27 
Australia’s now in a position where it must use its unique position on the Security Council to continue 
to advocate for a solution but be wary that with that increased involvement come increased risks on 
the international stage and at home. The more Australia involves itself in the Syrian conflict, the more 
potential jihadists may find to disagree with, and blame and threaten Australia.
Nevertheless, Australia is right to focus on humanitarian assistance and to push political 
negotiations. Despite the risks that come with further involvement, Australia should continue to 
advocate as an honest broker. The current tack that Australia is taking to shore up its humanitarian 
support is a correct one. So far, Australia has provided $78 million in humanitarian support for 
refugees and pledged $12 million more in aid for UNICEF and the Red Cross to help neighbouring 
countries host refugees under the previous government.28 
Australia also has a role to play in the matter of chemical weapons inspections and the effort 
to combat weapons proliferation. The most compelling rationale behind a military strike is the 
protection of international norms against chemical weapons proliferation. Even though Australia isn’t 
prepared to defend those norms with military assistance, it does have a long history in the effort to 
stem chemical weapons proliferation. Australia was a leader in establishing the Chemical Weapons 
Convention in 1997, and also formerly led UNSCOM.
There’s residual capacity in Australia to assist in chemical weapons inspections, and Canberra 
should offer those services to the UN as it investigates Syria further. It can rhetorically, politically 
and practically support this effort at the UN and on the international stage as the Syrian conflict 
ratchets up. 
Former Foreign Minister Bob Carr has been a steady advocate of the rights of minorities in the 
Middle East and has repeatedly called attention to the perils they face in this transition period.29 The 
Coalition too has taken the issue of minorities in the Middle East to heart. It’s important that Australia 
continue to bring attention to minority rights in the region, both because it’s a reflection of Australian 
values and because repairing pluralism in the Middle East is a means to stability in the region.
It can do this by repeatedly bringing the issue to the attention of the region’s leaders and raising it 
in international forums. In working on a solution to the Syrian conflict, pluralism and minority rights 
must factor into a conversation that all too often involves a toss-up between supporting a majority 
Sunni insurgency or a minority Alawite government.
It’s also useful for countries like Australia to frame the issues in the Middle East beyond sectarian 
terms. Deep-seated structural governance problems are facing the region and are affecting people 
of all sects. While one certainly can’t and shouldn’t ignore the sectarian dimension, it’s worth noting 
on a regular basis and on the international stage that the region can move beyond sectarianism and 
majoritarianism as it tackles its issues and that the problems facing the Middle East are structural and 
a matter of governance, rather than solely sectarian divisions.
Along with Australia’s UNSC seat came chairmanship of the UN Sanctions Committee responsible 
for monitoring international compliance with sanctions regimes against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
Iran and reporting any violations. Dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, which it claims is for peaceful 
purposes but which many believe to be for weapons, is a key issue in determining the balance of 
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power in the Middle East and will affect the three trends outlined in this paper. However, Australia’s 
ability to affect this issue via the Security Council is more limited than its ability to affect the others.
In theory, the Sanctions Committee should give Australia a platform to contribute effectively to 
caulking the sanctions regimes and influence outcomes on the Iranian nuclear question. In fact, the 
chairmanship of this committee isn’t as influential as it sounds.
While detailing the effectiveness of sanctions is beyond the scope of this analysis, many academic 
and policy assessments of the Iran sanctions regime, particularly UN sanctions, have been mixed at 
best. Most have found that the monitoring of violations has lacked effectiveness and that violators 
have rarely been punished. Member states also lack the political will to increase their effectiveness, 
particularly China and Russia, which only reluctantly agreed to the current round of UN sanctions 
against Iran. Over the years, both countries have become increasingly hostile to the use of sanctions. 
While the UN’s actions on Iran are more cohesive than its actions on Syria, a fractious Security 
Council has reduced the effectiveness of a number of UN sanctions.30 It isn’t clear that Australia’s 
chairmanship will change this situation.
However, by having a UNSC seat, Australia has distinguished itself from its previous position in the 
region as merely an ‘ally of the US’. It now has a distinct and different way to exert influence, advocate 
for international action in the region and push countries in transition towards meaningful reform.
The UNSC position has its limitations. Chinese and Russian opposition to almost any kind of 
international intervention has handicapped the Security Council, so gaining any resolutions or 
agreements will be laborious. Australia’s position as head of a sanctions committee is a thankless 
task, but its tenure on the UNSC has coincided with a unique moment in the Middle East—one it 
can influence to secure Australia’s global and regional interests as well as contribute to the path to 
stability in a still troubled region.
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